Application of this doctrine, however, has not been rigid. It has been judicially tempered through the years to permit the satisfaction of civil claims against a dissolved corporation out of the assets of its liquidating estate 4 and even its stockholder distributees, 5 particularly in a merger situation. 6 But, apparently, no suggestion is found in the common law that penal actions may survive corporate dissolution. 7 In addition, today, most states have enacted statutes conferring on a corporation the capacity to sue and be sued for a specified period of time after dissolution" or merger5 9 but these statutes have not been commonly interpreted to comprehend criminal litigation. ANN. § § 6io.i8, 612.32, 612.47 (1944) In the Safeway case defendant corporation made a bona fide dissolution shortly before the return of an indictment under the Sherman Act. The court found that none of the statutes of the states involved provided for the survival of criminal actions. As a matter of fact, after the Safeway "dissolution" a "new" corporation carried on the business with Whether criminal litigation survives a corporate merger was recently considered in United States v. Line Material Company." Line Material and two other corporations were alleged to have engaged in monopolistic and restrictive practices in the manufacture and sale of street lighting equipment in the United States. 2 After having been indicted for alleged violation of sections one and two of the Sherman Anti-trust Act,' 3 the defendant, a Delaware corporation, vertically merged in good faith with another corporation. The indictment was dismissed. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, after making the usual finding that at common law all litigation to which a corporation is a party abates upon dissolution, 4 affirmed" on the ground that the law of the state of incorporation made no provision for survival of criminal litigation after corporate dissolution by merger.
Section 42 of the Delaware Corporation Law provides that dissolved corporations shall be continued for three years "for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against them, and of enabling them gradually to settle and dose their business.., provided, however, that with respect to any action, suit or proceeding" commenced prior to the same name, property, stockholders, etc. Marcus, supra note x at 704.
In the Borden case defendant corporations executed a bona fide merger approximately two and a half years before an indictment was returned under the Sherman Act; thereafter, the merged corporation sold out and dissolved. The court construed section 6o of the Delaware Corporation Law to abate the criminal action.
(It is interesting to note that, although the court put the abatement on the ground of the earlier merger, in fact the corporation later "truly" dissolved before abatement was pleaded.) "Although significant differences are apparent between "true" dissolution, and dissolution by merger, the court in the present case based its decision on the reasoning in the Safeway and Borden cases, discussed supra note xo.
or within three years after dissolution, they shall be continued beyond the three year period." (emphasis supplied) Section 62 provides that " [a] ny action or proceeding pending by or against any [corporation] merged may be prosecuted ... as if such merger had not taken place or the corporation resulting from . . . such .. .merger may be substituted in its place.' 7 (emphasis supplied) Noting that the word "suits" was the "dominating term" of section 42, and that by general usage it refers only to civil litigation, the court reasoned that the words "action" and "proceeding" appearing in the same section and in section 62 must be similarly restricted." 8 As further buttressing this conclusion, the court also observed that the substitution of parties permitted by section 62 is not characteristic of a criminal prosecution."
On a purely verbal level, while it is true, as the court noted, that the word "suits" generally refers only to civil litigation,° the same cannot unequivocally be said of the words "action"'" and "proceeding." 22 The court's unconditional equation of these words in this context, therefore, is not beyond exception. Particularly is this so in view of the fact that section 62 is expressly applicable to "any action or proceeding" (emphasis supplied), and does not even mention "suit." Accordingly, it may be plausibly argued that section 62 saves criminal litigation in dissolutions by merger despite the fact that section 42 may not similarly operate in the winding up of a "truly" dissolved corporation.
Nor do the court's conclusions appear to be irresistibly compelled by policy considerations. 23 If one assumes arguendo that Line Material was guilty of restraint, monopoliza-
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NOTES natural persons would seem to be a frail reed, at best, upon which to rest a conclusion as to whether or not criminal litigation survives corporation dissolution-particularly in cases of dissolution by merger, where the continuity of management, ownership, and properties finds no ready anthropomorphic cognate. Although it may be contended that the possible unjust enrichment of the successor corporation is mitigated by potential treble damage suits, 2 4 which have been held to be maintainable after dissolution or merger," 25 it is notorious that this remedy is more theoretical than real . 2 Further, the effectiveness of injunctive relief, 27 is dubiousi 28 and the difficulties inherent in pursuing individual corporate directors, 2 1 whom the anti-trust laws make jointly liable for corporate derelictions, render this alternative of little practical value.3 0 tion, and pricing agreement as charged, its merger, albeit for bona fide purposes, would produce an even greater monopolization as result of the vertical combihation. See BUCHANAN, THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE 316 f. (1940). If it were later determined that such a merger violated the anti-trust acts because of the continuance of practices deemed wrongful in the case of the old Line Material Company and/or its combination with the emerging corporation, the federal government must retrace its steps and seek a new indictment against the surviving corporation. The attendant expense, waste, and tactical folly of such duplicity seems apparent. "The anti-trust "crime" in action operates similarly to a tort by which defendant corporation is unjustly enriched, a fortiori, enrichment to the emerging corporation in a merger situation. There has been some thought that regardless of individual actions the government should be able to act for the damage done the public; that the public interest is poorly served by leaving to private parties the burden of enforcement is evident. See Berge, supra note 30.
"See SOUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 34 (949). 
